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1. Introduction 
Over the last one and a half decades unprecedented efforts at privatisation have been taken 
around the world which amounted to their peak in the second half of the 1990s (Belke/Schneider 
2005). Between 1990 and 2000, total privatisation proceeds in more than one hundred countries 
amounted to 937 billion US-$ (OECD 2003a: 7). More than 70 percent of the proceeds were 
raised by OECD member states. In turn, 62 percent of OECD members’ proceeds accrued in the 
EU-15. Since we are especially interested in the relationship between the institutional 
environment of the EU economies and the speed of privatisation, we focus solely on EU 
countries in this paper. 
Several authors display the pattern of national privatisation proceeds between 1990 and 2000 in 
detail (Belke/Schneider 2005, Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 2004). The main feature emerging is that the 
privatisation issue and the proceeds from privatisation have been a considerable and policy 
relevant issue in the 1990s also for the EU economies. However, notwithstanding the temporal 
coincidence of privatisations among different countries, significant differences emerge between 
countries concerning the revenues raised from privatisation between 1990 and 2000. 
The major goal of our contribution is that we apply the classical theoretical approaches of 
comparative public policy research and employ macro-quantitative methods of data analysis to 
explain these differences and to identify the underlying economic and political-institutional 
determinants. Above all, we investigate the driving forces behind the emergence of privatisation 
proceeds in member countries of the EU at the end of our sample period. However, we had to 
exclude Luxemburg due to data limitations. In view of the small number of only 14 countries, we 
make use of a panel approach.  
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Privatisations do not necessarily imply deregulation, for instance, in the telecom-, gas-, 
electricity- and other service markets but may occur in various forms. It is even possible that 
privatisation may only change the shape of government intervention with respect to service 
provision, regulation and financing (Feigenbaum/Henig/Hamnett 1998: 6). In this paper we focus 
on the sale of state-owned enterprises. Hence, we neither investigate the methods of privatisation 
(OECD 2003a) nor the utilisation of privatisation proceeds and the consequences of privatisation 
(Belke/Schneider 2005). The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: After a brief review 
of the existing literature (chapter 2), the most important theoretical approaches in comparative 
public choice research are surveyed to generate testable hypotheses (chapter 3). In chapter 4, the 
empirical evidence is presented, while the last section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Previous Research: Some Short Remarks 
Large parts of research on privatisations have stressed the timing and regional spillovers of 
privatisations. Early studies focused on the pivotal role of Thatcherism in the area of privatisation 
in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. This was interpreted to have a deep policy impact on and 
wide diffusion to many other EU countries.
1 More recent studies focus on the direct and indirect 
impacts of European integration on privatisation. More specifically, the liberalisation efforts 
launched by the European Commission in the 1980s and the fiscal policy constraints imposed by 
the Treaty of Maastricht are discussed as catalysts of privatisation
2. In addition, there is a 
considerable number of studies which investigate the privatisation record in particular countries
3. 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Abromeit (1988), Wright (1994: 5), and Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004). 
2 See Belke/Schneider (2005), Clifton/Comin/Diaz Fuentes (2003), Scharpf (1999), and Schmidt (1998). 
3 Compare, for instance, Clarke/Pitelis (1993), Feigenbaum/Henig/Hamnett (1998), Sinn/Whalley (2004), Toninelli 
(2000), Vickers/Wright (1989), and Wright (1994).  
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On the contrary, quantitative investigations of the driving forces behind the differences in 
privatisation proceeds are still quite rare up to now. One of the few examples is the seminal study 
by Boix (1997). He refers mainly to political variables to investigate the differences in 
privatisation efforts in OECD countries from 1979 to 1992. According to the results of this study, 
there is a significant positive impact on privatisation proceeds under right-wing parties, whereas 
significantly lower efforts to privatise are observed under left-wing regimes. Moreover, the 
internal fragmentation of the cabinet and the status as minority government seems to significantly 
hamper inhibit privatisations. Finally, a kind of problem pressure seems to matter as well, since a 
weak economic performance prior to the period of observation is significantly enhancing the 
extent of sales of state-owned enterprises (SOE). Bortolotti/Fantini/Siniscalco (2003) and 
Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004) compare the privatisation pattern of 48 countries between 1977 and 
1999. They cannot reject empirically that political institutions and political parties have a 
significant impact on privatisation effort. Specifically, a right-wing orientation of the government 
significantly fosters privatisation proceeds. Moreover, proceeds are significantly higher in 
majoritarian democracies than in countries with horizontal and vertical fragmentation of power. 
In addition, privatisation revenues are significantly lower in autocracies than in democracies 
(Bortolotti/Siniscalco 2004: 55). Hence, political regime types are also important from another 
angle. Finally, the panel study finds a significantly lower propensity to privatise in German civil 
law countries. If the analysis is limited to the OECD countries, effects of political institutions 
stay significant, albeit their indicator of government partisanship does not prove to be significant 
any more. Most important, Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004: 56) suggest that “a more proper test of the 
partisan dimension of privatisation should be carried out in the context of wealthy and established 
democracies.”  
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Our paper attempts to fill this gap by exploiting a new data set approximating the partisan 
composition of governments. At the same time, we investigate whether the partisan effects found 
by Boix (1997) for the 1980s still exist in the 1990s at least for the EU, a period of marked 
diversity of public enterprise ownership and performance. Finally, in contrast for instance to 
Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004), we apply several indicators to measure institutional pluralism and 
directly assess the impact of national constitutional rigidities. 
In this respect, our contribution is closest to the recent study by Obinger/Zohlnhöfer (2004), 
which investigates the differences in the privatisation proceeds raised by EU and OECD countries 
between 1990 and 2000. They show that privatisations are one element of a process of economic 
liberalisation in previously highly regulated economies. Moreover, they can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the fiscal policy challenges imposed by European integration and, more generally, to 
the globalisation of financial markets. Finally, their results imply significant and negative effects 
of institutional pluralism and union militancy yield on privatisation proceeds. Interestingly, 
partisan differences only emerge if economic problems appear to be moderate, whereas pressing 
economic, in particular fiscal problems seem to make differing partisan strategies less relevant. 
One possible area of improvement from their study is the specification of the empirical model. 
Obinger/Zohlnhöfer (2004) use classic OLS regression with a single cross-section of data. 
However, such a procedure has several limitations. It is therefore preferable to use panel data and 
more sophisticated estimation methods. We will take up this issue in chapter 4. First, however, 
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3. Some Theoretical Considerations 
In order to deliver a sound explanation of the differences of the privatisation proceeds among the 
EU countries, we stick to the well-established theoretical approaches of public policy and public 
choice research which have been used successfully in a number of policy fields. The public 
choice approach concentrates on political coalitions and their effect on input usage and reward 
and/or product characteristics. The public choice approach also includes the theory of 
bureaucracy and appears to provide a broader analysis than the property rights one. It assumes 
that politicians, bureaucrats, managers of public enterprises are selfish utility maximisers subject 
to constraints. In this approach it is assumed, e.g., for a politician that he acts selfish in order to 
reach his ideological or personal goals under the constraint not to loose the next election. Since to 
stay in power is the most important constraint (or even sometimes a goal) for a politician, he will 
also use public utilities for his own selfish goals.
4 In the remaining parts of the paper, we will 
concentrate on six approaches, which should be interpreted as partly complementary with each 
another. 
3.1 Privatisation as means to cope with macroeconomic problem pressure 
It is sometimes argued that an increase in privatisation effort is not more than a reaction of 
governments to economic challenges. Hence, privatisations should be observed when the 
macroeconomic problem pressure is high. Faced with high unemployment, decent economic 
growth and excessive public debt, governments tend to follow the at first glance less popular 
recommendations of supply-side economics which has increasingly dominated the economic 
policy debate since the 1980s (Hall 1993, Boix 1997). Both, the microeconomic and case study 
data are supportive of the positive effects of privatisation as an important imperative of supply 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Boes/Schneider (1996), Castles (1998), Mueller (2002), Schmidt (2002), and Schneider (2002).  
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side economics, i.e. to roll back the state’s influence on the economy, over time on growth and 
employment (Davis/Ossowski/Richardson/Barnett 2000, Megginson/Netter 2001). These results 
reflect geographical diversity and are representative of a range of privatisation experience in 
European Union countries, but are less pronounced for transition and developing countries. 
According to this approach, the main focus is on the privatisation of state owned enterprises 
(SOE) since it is by now a stylised fact that privately owned firms are more efficient than SOE 
(Megginson/Netter 2001, Belke/Schneider 2005). Due to government intervention, SOEs as a 
rule experience a lack of clearly defined goals. They just face an important conflict between 
efficiency-enhancing profit maximisation and following traditional targets of government policy 
in the fields of employment or industrial policy that may result in severe efficiency losses. 
However, inferior efficiency of SOE can also be caused by the absence of a “hard” budget 
constraint and the capture of SOEs by utility-maximising politicians and selfish bureaucrats who 
tend to exploit public enterprises to secure their influence and power. If privatisation is associated 
with increasing market competition like within the EU’s single market program, efficiency gains 
of privatisation are supposed to be even larger (Schneider 2002). 
Hence, there are good theoretical reasons for privatisation and that the proceeds from 
privatisation, especially if used in a clever fashion in the areas of education, technology, and 
infrastructure, can increase the welfare of such countries. The main reason is that the classical 
public good argument still applies for these areas. Privatisations foster economic growth and, 
thus, also employment. Governments will most likely be more inclined to follow this advice if 
they and their electoral constituency are confronted with unsatisfactory economic performance 
(Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 2004). Hence, we expect a negative impact of economic growth on 
privatisation proceeds, since poor growth performance will increase a government’s inclination to  
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implement growth-stimulating measures, including privatisation. As the other side of the same 
coin, unemployment should be a positive driving force of privatisation revenues. 
The overall intensity of state regulation of the economy is one important determinant underlying 
these economic problems. It might become even more significant in view of increasing 
globalisation and, thus, governments’ competition for investment. From this point of view, an 
economic policy approach of deregulation and privatisation could contribute to make markets 
more flexible and to give some leeway for the unravelling of growth and employment in heavily 
regulated economies that would otherwise suffer from low economic growth. Hence, we expect a 
positive impact of the level of regulation of the economy, i.e. a negative impact of economic 
freedom, on privatisation efforts and finally on proceeds. 
Public finance, particularly public debt, also has direct impacts on privatisation efforts. A 
government, which is plagued by a high level of public debt and/or a distinct budget deficit, tends 
to strive for options to cope with this problem. However, most measures that have budget 
consolidation as the main target, e.g. expenditure cuts and tax increases, are unpopular among the 
voters. Hence, reducing a public deficit or even turn it into the positive is always politically 
difficult to achieve. The privatisation of SOE may well support governments to solve this 
dilemma by raising revenues, diminishing subsidies for SOE and abolishing the need to bail their 
deficits out (Wright 1994: 20, Boix 1997: 477). Hence, privatisations are able to markedly 
improve the budgetary stance without hampering taxpayers even further or incur spending cuts. 
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3.2 Government ideology, partisanship and privatisations 
From the literature on Partisan Political Business Cycles it is well known that the propensity of 
governments to adhere to supply-side economics is dependent on the partisan (ideological) 
orientation of their constituency. For instance, the conservative Thatcher and Reagan 
governments in the UK and in the United States and to a lesser extent also the bourgeois 
coalitions in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands in the early eighties may serve as examples 
of the adoption of important elements of supply side economics. Since partisan theory actually 
argues that right-wing parties favour market solutions in economic policy anyway, the propensity 
of centre-right parties to sell off state-owned enterprises tends to be higher than that of centre-left 
ones, since partisan theory essentially argues that these parties favour market solutions in 
economic policy anyway.
5 
Moreover, right-wing governments are often said to have an electoral incentive to strive for 
privatisation, since right-wing executives with re-election concerns design privatisation to spread 
share ownership among domestic voters.
6 By selling under-priced shares in the domestic retail 
market (as in the UK in the 1980s) and not abroad, right-wing governments attract the median 
voter, shape a constituency interested in the maximisation of the value of financial assets and 
averse to redistribution policies to the left. As a consequence, the economic interests of many 
voters may change in favour of the more market-friendly policies implemented by bourgeois 
parties which might promise to maximise the value of their shares.
7 
                                                 
5 See Belke/Schneider (2005), Bortolotti/Fantini/Siniscalco (2003: 308), Obinger/Zohlnhöfer (2004: 6), and Schmidt 
(2002). 
6 Most prominent examples are the recent “right-wing” coalition in Austria, the privatisation in the UK as a part of a 
whole “right-wing” Thatcherism package, or the French privatisation as an element of the now-famous Mitterand U-
turn in economic policies towards a “right-wing” orientation. 
7 See Abromeit (1988) and Richardson (1994: 69).  
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Left-wing parties, in contrast, until recently declared a lack of confidence in the stability of the 
private sector. This manifested itself in the fact that nationalisations of key industries were 
important elements in these parties’ economic strategies. SOEs were typically utilised as 
“employment buffers” during recessions and as important instruments of macroeconomic fine-
tuning.
8 Moreover, partisan theory has always stressed that left-wing parties face electoral 
incentives to delay privatisation since SOE employees represent an important part of their core 
clientele and most probably are among the main losers of privatisation. Hence, we expect right-
wing governments to be positively related to privatisation proceeds, whereas left-wing 
governments should lead to lower privatisation revenues. 
3.3. Do institutions matter for privatisations? 
In most cases the decision to privatise results from a legislative process. Consequently, political 
institutions should be an important determinant of privatisation effort. It is well known from 
standard veto player theory that a change away from the status quo becomes more difficult in the 
number of veto players – mainly due to increasing transaction costs (Tsebelis 2002). Moreover, 
the probability of one player vetoing the privatisation decision increases, when the number of 
players grows. In our EU-15 context, powerful second chambers, strong presidents or direct 
democracy might be considered as the relevant prominent veto players.
9 The procedures for 
changing the constitution may have an impact on privatisation effort as well, because SOE 
enjoyed protection by the constitution in some countries like France and Portugal (Corkill 1994: 
219-20, Feigenbaum//Henig/Hamnett 1998: 108-109). Hence, we can derive the hypothesis that 
privatisation proceeds will be negatively influenced by the number and power of veto players 
                                                 
8 See Belke/Schneider (2005) and Schneider (2002). Examples are the Austro-Keynesian type of stabilisation policy 
until the 1980s, the nationalisation policies of the French socialist government after 1981, and the rather slow speed 
of amending the British Labour Party program, especially the hotly debated “Clause IV”. See Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 
(2004). 
9 Programmatic dissent or the fact that important political allies, interest groups or decisive parts of the electorate 
oppose a privatisation might be the reason. For example, see Dumez/Jeunemaitre (1994: 93).  
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like, for instance, second chambers, presidents and referenda. Complementarily, if an amendment 
of the constitution is more difficult, privatisation proceeds should turn out to be lower.  
The fragmentation of governments should have an impact on the intensity of privatisation efforts 
as well, the direction of which is ambiguous, however. The larger the number of parties in a 
government coalition is the more difficult privatisations become according to veto player theory 
(Boix 1997: 481). Nevertheless, there are also arguments making the opposite hypothesis 
plausible: If coalition governments aspire to reduce budget deficits – according to the EU’s 
Maastricht criteria – they could resort to the most uncontroversial consolidation path, i.e. the 
lowest level of common compromise. Given the heavy political resistance and interest group 
pressure against expenditure cuts or tax increases, privatisation might be the way out of the 
dilemma and the most tractable solution. 
The allocation of competencies between different levels of government should have an impact on 
the privatisation effort of EU countries as well. As it was the case in Germany at the end of the 
eighties, SOEs are not necessarily owned by the central government in federal states. It might 
well be that most of the potential for privatisation is at the level of the states and the local 
authorities. Low privatisation proceeds of central governments with a high propensity to privatise 
might be the consequence if SOEs are held by local or regional authorities that hesitate to give up 
their holdings. However, this effect might also run the opposite way: a central government that is 
averse to privatisation might also be unable to prevent regional or local authorities from 
privatising their SOEs. 
Hence, the overall impact of federalism is difficult to derive from theory. A significant negative 
impact of the degree of federalism on privatisations does only make sense if a central government 
strives at selling off a state-owned enterprise of high regional importance but sees itself opposed  
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by regional authorities refusing to privatisation and disposing of formal or informal ways of 
influencing the decision-making process at the federal level.
10 Hence, a weak negative impact of 
the extent of federalism on privatisation proceeds would be plausible overall. 
3.4 Interest groups and privatisations 
Generally, the interests of the employers’ associations and of unions concerning privatisation 
policies are sharply opposed to each other. Most enterprises might actually support the 
privatisation of public utilities like telecommunication, energy and transportation since they 
expect lower charges stemming from efficiency gains and, thus, an attraction of further clients. 
Additionally, they hope to act as buyers of shares of privatised formerly SOE at the stock 
exchange. Nevertheless, since collective representation of the diverging interests on the part of 
these associations is not possible in the end, these enterprises are unlikely to express their strong 
interest in favour of privatisation policies. On the contrary, labour unions, not only those of 
affected employees, after all experience tend to oppose privatisations, since the employees of 
SOEs profit from reasonably safe and well-paid jobs and well above-average working conditions 
(Schwartz 2001). Moreover, union density is much more significant in the public sector than in 
the private sector. Hence, privatisation seriously challenges the comfortable situation of the 
SOE’s employees. One instructive example in this respect is the liberalisation and privatisation of 
the telecommunications sector throughout Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. During this structural 
change, more jobs were lost in the former SOE than were created by the newly established ones. 
Moreover, the new jobs were less protected and worse paid than the ones lost (Héritier/Schmidt 
2000). Hence, it appears overall plausible that unions had a strong incentive to plea and to 
                                                 
10 Examples for this scenario can be found in the process of privatisation in Germany in the 1980s, especially in 
Bavaria and Lower Saxony. See Obinger/Zohlnhöfer (2004: 7).  
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mobilise against the privatisation of SOEs. One empirical implication is that privatisation 
revenues should be lower if union strength or militancy is large. 
3.5 Supra-national impacts on privatisation: EU-membership as the “whipping boy”? 
Privatisation might also be influenced by international factors, in our case of the EU-15, most 
notably by European integration and the globalisation of financial and other markets. It is often 
argued that national economic policy autonomy is increasingly monitored and eventually even 
punished by international financial markets under high capital mobility. As a consequence, 
credibility becomes a major goal of governments (Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 2004: 8). Thus, in order to 
gain this credibility governments tend to switch to conventional “hard-nosed” economic policies 
that include the selling of SOE. Moreover, privatisations have a beneficial impact on a 
government’s budgetary stance that is an important signal for international capital markets 
(Mosley 2000). Hence, an EU country’s privatisation proceeds should be positively dependent on 
its level of economic integration into the world economy. 
European Integration also can well be a catalyst of privatisation efforts, as was seen in the 
Southern European countries in particular (Lavdas 1996). One can think of two ways of impacts: 
first via the single market program, which led to the liberalisation of many sectors, and second 
through the Maastricht fiscal criteria.
11 We now turn to the first channel. A great bulk of the 
liberalised services was provided by SOE prior to liberalisation through the single market 
program. However, the legitimacy of state ownership vanished in the wake of ongoing 
liberalisation. Hence, privatisation was required for the success of the liberalisation. Moreover, 
increasing competition in the relevant markets represented another important motive for 
privatisation. If the former state monopolies were to succeed after liberalisation, i.e. under 
conditions of significant competition on the home market or as a global player in world markets, 
                                                 
11 See Schmidt (1998) and Clifton/Comin/Diaz Fuentes (2003).  
   13
they had to be freed from the politically and/or administratively motivated restrictions that are 
typical of public enterprises.
12 
Secondly, also the Maastricht fiscal criteria played a preponderant role for the strive for 
privatisation in EU countries. European governments with their aim of joining monetary union 
were obliged to reach a current public deficit of less than 3 percent of GDP and an overall public 
debt below 60 percent of GDP in 1997. Since the debt criterion gave leeway for some exceptions, 
EU governments mainly focused on fulfilling the public budget deficit. Hence, the public deficit 
criterion (and its consecutor, the stability and growth pact) exerts intense fiscal pressure at least 
on those governments that already incurred a significant risk of failing. Although the Maastricht 
Treaty does not allow the direct use of privatisation proceeds to lower the relevant public deficit 
figure, these governments in turn seem likely to resort to privatisations since government net 
worth will rise to the extent that private sector ownership leads to an increase in efficiency and 
the government shares in this gain. 
The macroeconomic effects of privatisation depend, in part, on whether receipts/proceeds are 
from domestic or foreign sources, the degree of capital mobility and the exchange regime. 
Broadly the effects of a decrease in the deficit financed by privatisation receipts would be similar 
to those resulting from a debt financed fiscal expansion. Both the economic recovery and 
privatisations lead to receipts that can be used to lower the deficit. The use of proceeds to reduce 
external debt provides for an automatic sterilisation of what may be substantial capital inflows 
associated with privatisation. The reduction of domestic debt may impact domestic stability. 
Redemption and interest payments become lower by collecting privatisation receipts. Hence, 
privatisation takes some of the strain off the budget and the capital market by lower interest rates. 
                                                 
12 See Wright (1994: 4) and Schmidt (1996).  
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This in turn increases efficiency that tends to improve prospects for the labour market as well 
after some restructuring period.  
3.6 Path-dependence of privatisation efforts 
Finally, the level of state ownership at the beginning of our period of observation comes into play 
as an explanation of privatisation efforts in the EU. The differences in the size of the SOE sector 
can be interpreted as an equivalent of the potential for privatisation at the disposal of the 
governments in the 1990s.
13 Starting from the observation that a government can only privatise as 
many SOE as are in its hands, the amount of privatisation proceeds should be particularly low in 
countries where the state as a tradition owned only a few enterprises (for instance, in Germany) 
or sold most of the SOEs before 1990 (e.g., the United Kingdom). 
3.7 Summary of the theoretically derived hypotheses 
If we summarise the theoretically derived hypotheses we have the following 10 hypotheses, 
which we want to put under scrutiny by more formal empirical tests in the next section. From 
section 3.1 we have: 
Hypothesis 1: We expect a negative effect of economic growth on privatisation proceeds. 
Hypothesis 2: We expect a positive effect of unemployment on privatisation revenues. 
Hypothesis 3: We expect a positive effect of the initial level of political regulation of the 
economy on privatisation proceeds. 
Hypothesis 4: We expect a budget surplus to be negatively related to privatisation proceeds. 
Section 3.2 delivers the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
13 For the different reasons of nationalisations of enterprises see in detail Toninelli (2000: 10-21).  
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Hypothesis 5:  We expect right-wing parties to be positively associated with privatisation 
proceeds, whereas social democratic government participation should result in lower privatisation 
revenues. 
From section 3.3 we can derive: 
Hypothesis 6: We expect that privatisation proceeds will be inversely related to the number of 
veto players. 
Hypothesis 7: We expect a weak negative effect of federalism on privatisation proceeds. 
Section 3.4 results in: 
Hypothesis 8:  We expect that privatisation revenues decrease as union strength militancy 
increases. 
Section 3.5 comes up with the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 9: We expect that privatisation proceeds should be positively related to the level of a 
countries’ economic integration. 
Finally, from section 3.6 we have: 
Hypothesis 10:  We expect that privatisation proceeds will be particularly low in countries, 
where the government traditionally owned few enterprises or sold most of them before 1990. 
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4. Econometric Estimation Procedure and Results 
4.1. Methodological issues 
Previous research on the determinants of privatisation proceeds has employed simple pooled 
cross-sectional regressions (see, e.g., Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 2004). One problem with this type of 
analysis is that it assumes omitted variables to be randomly distributed within and across 
countries. This assumption is, however, extremely unrealistic in the present study since it 
assumes, e.g., that the effects of political and institutional factors on privatisation revenues are 
independent of any non-controlled differences across countries. The existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in the dataset can be tested with the Breusch Pagan test (Greene 2003: 572-573). 
The test statistics yields a chi-square of 3.93 (p-value: 0.047). The rejection of the null hypothesis 
of homogeneity suggests that the sample is too heterogeneous to be pooled. By disaggregating 
the sample to a panel of 11 yearly observations (1990-2000) for each of the 14 “old” EU member 
countries, a panel design, which overcomes the above discussed limitation, becomes feasible.
14  
In order to check what type of data we use and how the dependent and independent variables are 
defined, Table 1 presents the definition of variables.  
-Table 1 about here- 
Most variables in our dataset are index variables. Hence, non-stationarity should not be a matter 
of concern. For the remaining variables, stationarity was tested by the widely used Levin-Lin-
panel unit root test. Even in these cases, none of the variables turned out to be non-stationary. 
Accordingly, in the following empirical analysis all variables were used in levels. In order to 
determine the degree of heteroskedasticity, a likelihood ratio test was performed to compare the 
model with heteroskedasticity to the model without heteroskedasticity. As expected, the test 
                                                 
14 Recall that Luxembourg was removed from the sample due to missing data.  
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statistic indicates significant heteroskedasticity. Thus, any estimation procedure has to account 
for the heteroskedasticity property.  
Table 2 shows our empirical test equation with the parameters strictly indexed in accordance with 
the index of the hypotheses formulated at the end of section 3. Note that all economic variables 
and the strike variable are lagged one period in order to avoid a possible endogeneity bias. 
-Table 2 about here- 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 3 displays the regression results for different specifications of our model. The estimation 
technique is FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Squares) applied to panel data with a 
heteroskedastically consistent covariance matrix. The goodness of fit of each regression was 
checked by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayes information criterion (BIC).
15 
Additionally, the bottom part of the table includes a chi-square statistic that tests for the joint 
significance of all coefficients (other than the constant). The p-value of the test statistic is also 
included. 
- Table 3 about here- 
We start by establishing a full model with all variables included (first column of Table 3). All 
economic and most political variables perform as predicted. As expected, we identify a positive 
relationship between unemployment and privatisation proceeds (hypothesis 2). The level of 
federalism also appears to play an important role. A higher degree of federalism is associated 
with statistically significant lower privatisation proceeds (hypothesis 7). Consistently with 
hypothesis 3, economic freedom is negatively related to privatisation revenues. Only the 
                                                 
15 Note, however, that the AIC and BIC are only directly comparable if the number of observations is equal across 
different specifications.  
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coefficient of the initial level of state ownership (SOE) enters with the opposite sign to what we 
would expect from our theoretical model. This surprising result may be driven by problems of 
multicollinearity, given the high correlation between the size of the public sector (SOE) and the 
degree of economic freedom (ECOFREE).
16 Removing ECOFREE from the test equation results 
in a more consistent picture. As is evident from model (2), the variable SOE changes sign and 
turns out to be significant indicating that privatisation proceeds in the 1990s were higher in 
countries where the level of state ownership was high at the beginning of the decade (hypothesis 
10). Low GDP growth is now also positively associated with lower privatisation proceeds 
(hypothesis 1). The remaining variables are not significant at standard levels. The models (3) and 
(4) check for alternative specifications removing those variables that are not significant 
throughout our estimations. Both the sign and the statistical significance of the remaining 
variables do hardly change. The most notable change is that the variable SOE turns out to be 
significant even at the 1 percent level now. 
A comparison across different specifications reveals that the statistical significance of the 
variables is hardly affected by the removal of variables. In terms of goodness of fit, the chi-
square statistic shows that in all specifications coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 percent 
level. One may conclude that the information criteria identify regression (2) as the preferred 
model. However, one problem with the AIC and the BIC is that if several models have similar 
AIC or BIC values and if the number of observations varies across different specifications, as 
presently is the case, the difference is probably not of any consequence. 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the effects predicted by the model, consider the coefficient for 
UNER(-1) in column (1) of Table 3. The estimate of 0.048 implies that, ceteris paribus, a one-
point increase in the unemployment rate increases privatisation proceeds by 0.048 percent of 
                                                 
16 The correlation between both variables is r=0.67.  
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GDP. Results for the federalism variable are also as theoretically expected. A one standard 
deviation increase in the level of federalism would decrease privatisation proceeds by 0.93 
percent of GDP. In view of average yearly privatisation revenues of 0.67 percent of GDP, the 
economic effects of these results are small, but non-negligible. 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
Given the heterogeneity in the sample, we conducted a number of robustness checks to see 
whether our results are robust to the sample period, the countries in the sample, and the 
estimation procedure.  
A first robustness check adds interval dummies to the specification for three different sub-periods 
in order to model time effects (1990-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2000).
17 Table 4 displays the results 
for these estimations. 
-Table 4 about here- 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients and their significance levels increase notably. Again, 
the coefficients of the level of federalism and the initial level of state ownership display the 
expected sign and enter in a statistically significant fashion. The negative and statistically 
significant parameter coefficients of the variables GDP(-1) and GGFB(-1) lent support to the 
hypothesis that poor macroeconomic conditions such as low growth or a lax fiscal policy stance 
increase the incentive to privatise. However, the negative sign for UNER(-1) is at odds with such 
a view. The partisan variables both gain statistical significance, indicating that right-wing parties 
are more likely to privatise than their left-wing counterparts. Additionally, privatisation revenues 
increase with a country’s international economic integration (variable OPEN). 
                                                 
17 We did not use yearly time dummies because this would reduce the number of degrees of freedom below a critical 
level.  
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Table 5 tests the robustness of our regression results to changes in the sample of countries. We 
examined the stability of the results in terms of the country dimension by alternately removing 
countries with the highest and the lowest privatisation revenues. The EU member country with 
the highest privatisation proceeds in relation to GDP is Portugal. Models (1) and (2) in Table 5 
display the regression result when Portugal is excluded from the sample.  
-Table 5 about here- 
The pattern of results shows many similarities with the results obtained by the benchmark 
regression in Table 3. High unemployment and a high degree of decentralisation, and to a 
somewhat lesser extent also low growth, government ideology, and a high initial level of state 
ownership cannot be rejected to increase privatisation revenues, while the remaining variables are 
not statistically significant.  
Germany is the country with the lowest relative privatisation revenues. When it is removed from 
the sample (models (3) and (4) in Table 5), the degree of openness and the level of federalism 
change sign, but still enter statistically significantly. This result suggests that the positive 
relationship between centralisation and privatisation revenues found in our benchmark regression 
in Table 3 is exclusively driven by Germany - a country with a highly decentralised structure and 
very low privatisation proceeds in the 1990s. 
Finally, we test whether our results are independent of the estimation method. Beck/Katz (1995) 
propose that analysts deal with the complicated panel error process by using Prais-Winsten 
parameter estimates with asymptotic standard errors that are corrected for correlation between the 
panels (“panel corrected standard errors”, PCSE). Their Monte Carlo simulations showed that 
this method is accurate in the presence of contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity 
across panels. In order to use this procedure, any serial correlation of the data must be eliminated  
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before. Correcting for serial correlation is done by using the Prais-Winsten estimator, as indicated 
in Greene (2003). Following Beck/Katz (1995: 638) and Greene (2003: 605) who both strongly 
recommend estimating an AR coefficient that is the same for all countries, we preferred to 
impose the restriction of a common AR(1) across countries in all cases. The empirical 
performance of the variables when included in the PCSE estimation is presented in Table 6. 
-Table 6 about here- 
As before, the degree of federalism displays the expected sign and enters statistically significant. 
The results further confirm the important role of the initial level of state ownership. Moreover, 
the findings reveal that privatisation revenues increase with strike activity. The remaining 
variables are not statistically significant. GDP growth, government balance, and the partisan 
variable even change sign. Overall, the relatively low robustness with respect to the empirical 
specification is an important caveat to bear in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
What conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence? 
(1)  Apparently, the differences in privatisation proceeds of EU countries can primarily be 
traced back to the specific economic problems these countries face. This appears to be especially 
the case if the degree of problem pressure is measured by the unemployment rate, but also - after 
some modifications of the econometric testing framework - if GDP growth, the general 
government financial balance and the degree of globalisation/integration are considered.  
(2)  But some political variables also contribute to an explanation of the national variations 
among EU countries in the revenues from the sales of state-owned enterprises. At least the  
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significant and expected findings for the right parties cabinet portfolios as a share of all cabinet 
portfolios – although not in our basic specification including all potential variables but in many 
cases throughout the robustness check section - suggest that the partisan ideology of government 
also plays a significant role. In principle, thus, we were able to replicate the seminal findings by 
Boix (1997). Some differentiations have to be made, however. Our analysis did uncover 
significant partisan differences in the EU, but they are conditional, meaning that they only occur 
if we control for time effects or for countries that are outliers in terms of privatisation revenues. 
That is to say, party ideology becomes relevant if exogenous events like the EU-entry of some 
countries in the sample in 1995 are taken into account as well. But note that the partisan effect is 
still there if one acknowledges that countries which are confronted with intense economic, 
particularly unemployment problems (see again the overall significance of the unemployment 
variable!) tend to adopt similar privatisation policies. This last result sharply contrasts with the 
results in Obinger/Zohlnhöfer (2004). 
(3)  We also have identified a certain kind of path-dependence that should have fostered 
privatisations irrespective of the partisan orientation of the respective government, namely an 
initially high level of state-owned enterprises. Hence, we are finally able to empirically 
corroborate the hypothesis for EU countries that privatisation proceeds are particularly low if the 
government traditionally owned few enterprises or sold most of them before 1990. Moreover, we 
detect a positive effect of the initial level of political regulation of the economy on privatisation 
proceeds. Apparently, an initially high regulatory density proves to be an important legacy of the 
past for the amount of privatisation proceeds. 
(4)  Based on our empirical results privatisation efforts can also be interpreted as a reaction to 
an increasing level of the EU countries’ economic integration since our variable measuring the 
share of overall exports and imports over GDP is significant with the expected sign in most of  
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our specifications. This result again stresses the increasing importance of supranational and trans-
national influences on national policymaking. Political-economic aspects relating to ideology 
also appear to play an important role in explaining the extent of privatisation within the EU-15. 
Boix (1997) argues that parties, since they have become unable to pursue party-specific 
macroeconomic policies because of globalised financial markets, now primarily focus on 
diverging supply-side policies. This claim is clearly corroborated by our empirical results. Since 
our right-wing partisan variable is significant more often than the left-wing partisan, our results 
are also compatible with the insight that in times of austerity even left-wing parties tend to 
exploit the political advantage of raising extra revenues without causing larger political conflicts 
by means of privatisation instead of playing the Keynesian card and to incur additional public 
debt (Belke/Schneider 2005, Boix 1997: 479). 
(5)  In addition to the growing significance of supranational impacts on national privatisation 
policies, domestic institutional settings like federalism and constitutional rigidity are not as 
important as expected. While Germany - a country with a highly decentralised structure and very 
low privatisation proceeds in the 1990s - seems to bias the significance of the results for the 
federalism variable towards accepting the positive relationship between centralisation and 
privatisation revenues, the number of veto players is never significant throughout all of our 
different estimations. Hence, our empirical evidence is in accordance with our view that the 
effect of federalism is theoretically difficult to determine. In addition, our results certainly do not 
corroborate veto player theory that claims a status quo bias of countries with many veto players. 
Neither are our results in accordance with the results reported by Bortolotti/Siniscalco (2004) 
who identified majoritarian democracies as a catalyst for privatisations. These results again 
contradict the results gained in previous studies (see, e.g., Obinger/Zohlnhöfer 2004). Finally, we 
do not find any empirical evidence that severe industrial conflicts reduce privatisations in EU  
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countries. Apparently, it is not the unions’ conflict behaviour that is decisive for the successful 
implementation of privatisation programs, since the number of working days lost due to strikes is 
never statistically significant throughout all specifications.
18 
(6)  Privatisation has been a key element of structural policy reforms in most EU countries 
during the last decade. Governments undertaking privatisation have pursued a variety of 
objectives: achieving gains in economic efficiency, given the extensive prevalence of poor 
economic performance of public enterprises in many countries and limited success with their 
reform; and improving the fiscal position, particularly in cases where governments have been 
unwilling or unable to continue to finance deficits in the public enterprise sector. 
(7)  Finally, to summarise: This paper empirically investigates the differences in the motives 
of raising privatisation proceeds for a sample of EU countries for the time period 1990 to 2000. 
More specifically, we test whether privatisations can be mainly interpreted can be mainly 
interpreted (a) as ingredients of a larger reform package of economic liberalisation in formerly 
overregulated economies, (b) as a reaction to an increasing macroeconomic problem pressure and 
(c) as a means to foster growth and, thus, increase tax income and relax the fiscal stance with an 
eye on the demands by integration of economic and financial markets (dependent on the degree 
of federalism). Whereas we are able to corroborate claim (a) only partly, we gain consistent 




                                                 
18 The last result again does not correspond to the results in Obinger/Zohlnhöfer (2004) who show empirically that it 
is not the unions’ organisational strength but their conflict behaviour that is decisive for the successful 
implementation of privatisation programs.  
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Appendix  
Table 1: Data description and sources  
Variable Description  Source 




GDP  Annual growth rate of GDP  World Bank (2003) 
UNER  Rate of unemployment  OECD (2005) 
ECOFREE  Economic freedom, increasing values = 
increasing degree of economic freedom 
Gwartney/Lawson (2004) 
GGFB General  government  financial  balances, 
surplus (+) or deficit (-) as % of nominal 
GDP 
OECD (2002a) 
RPCAB  Right party cabinet portfolios as a % of all 
cabinet portfolios 
Swank (2005) 
LPCAB  Left party cabinet portfolios as a % of all 
cabinet portfolios 
Swank (2005) 
VETO  Number of veto players  Keefer/Stasavage (2003) 
FED  Level of federalism (1= centralized, 5= 
decentralized) 
Lijphart (1999) 




STRIKE  Yearly number of working days lost per 
1,000 employees through industrial conflict 
Armingeon/Leimgruber/Beyeler/Menegale 
(2004) 
OPEN  Share of exports and imports over GDP  World Bank (2003) 
SOE  Size of SOE sector in 1990  Europäischer Zentralverband der 
öffentlichen Wirtschaft (CEEP) (2000)  
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Table 2: Theoretically derived test equation explaining privatization proceeds 
(1) PRIV/GDP i,t =  
(Priv. Proceeds in % of GDP) 
αi ⋅ country-specific intercept  + 
  α1 ⋅ GDP (-1)i,t 
(Annual growth rate of GDP, 
lagged) 
+ 
  α2 ⋅ UNER (-1)i,t  
(Unemployment rate, lagged) 
+ 
  α3 ⋅ ECOFREE i,t  
(Economic freedom) 
+ 
  α4 ⋅ GGFB (-1)I,t  
(general government financial 
balances; surplus+, deficit-, 
lagged) 
+ 
  α5 ⋅ RPCAP i,t  
(Right parties cabinet 
portfolios as a % of all cabinet 
portfolios) 
+ 
  α6 ⋅ VETO i,t 
(Number of veto players) 
+ 
  α7 ⋅ FED I,t  
(Intensity of federalism) 
+ 
  α8 ⋅ STRIKE (-1)i,t  
(Number of working days lost 
through strikes, lagged) 
+ 
  α9 ⋅ OPEN (-1)i,t  
(economic openness, lagged) 
+ 
  α10 ⋅ SOE i,t  
(Size of the SOE-sector) 
+ 
  ε i,t  
(error term) 
 
with the expected signs= α1<0; α2>0; α3>0; α4<0; α5>0; α6<0; α7<0; 
α8<0;  α9>0;  α10>0;  i=  country,t = time (year); index number 
corresponds to hypothesis number in section 3. 
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Table 3: Determinants of privatization proceeds in 14 EU countries, 1989-2000, feasible generalized 
least squares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP(-1)  -0.023 -0.040*  -0.031 -0.025 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
UNER(-1)  0.048*** 0.034*  0.040*** 0.039** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
GGFB(-1)  -0.002 -0.009    
 (0.016)  (0.017)     
ECOFREE  -0.328*     
  (0.182)     
RPCAB 0.000  -0.000     
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
VETO  -0.025 -0.040 -0.034  
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)  
FED  -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) 
STRIKE(-1)  -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
OPEN(-1)  0.002 0.002 0.002  
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  
SOE -0.016  0.018*  0.030***  0.028*** 
  (0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 2.793*  0.184  0.064  0.051 
  (1.507) (0.232) (0.218) (0.171) 
Observations  97 97 114  114 
Number  of  countries  14 14 14 14 
Wald chi
2  48.97 39.10 52.01 46.44 
Prob>chi
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC  162.44 162.35 199.85 198.48 
BIC  190.76 188.09 219.00 212.16 
Note: Dependent variable is yearly privatization proceeds in percent of BIP.
 *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard deviations are reported below each value in brackets.  
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Table 4: Determinants of privatization proceeds in 14 EU countries, 1989-2000, feasible generalized 
least squares, robustness check in time dimension 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP(-1)  -0.022** -0.027** -0.027** -0.023** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
UNER(-1)  -0.026* -0.031* -0.027* -0.021 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
GGFB(-1)  -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.046*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
ECOFREE  -0.571***     
  (0.181)     
RPCAB  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
LPCAB     -0.005*** 
     (0.000) 
VETO  0.045 0.029    
 (0.032)  (0.033)     
FED  -0.091*** -0.101*** -0.112*** -0.119*** 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
STRIKE(-1)  0.000 0.000    
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
OPEN(-1)  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SOE -0.025  0.030***  0.036***  0.027*** 
  (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
p9597 0.115**  0.049  0.066*  0.093*** 
  (0.054) (0.050) (0.037) (0.036) 
p9800  0.714*** 0.640*** 0.624*** 0.666*** 
  (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) (0.060) 
Constant  4.215*** -0.486** -0.441** 0.167 
  (1.498) (0.225) (0.217) (0.221) 
Observations  97 97 97 97 
Number  of  countries  14 14 14 14 
Wald chi
2  429.65 410.27 394.84 452.40 
Prob>chi
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC  148.79 153.92 150.79 143.16 
BIC  182.26 184.81 176.53 168.91 
Note: Dependent variable is yearly privatization proceeds in percent of BIP.
 *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard deviations are reported below each value in brackets.  
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Table 5: Determinants of privatization proceeds, 1989-2000, Portugal (models (1) and (2)) and 
Germany (models (3) and (4)) are excluded from the regression, feasible generalized least squares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP(-1)  -0.040*  -0.024 -0.015  
  (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)  
UNER(-1) 0.041**  0.045***  0.058***  0.032* 
  (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) 
GGFB(-1) -0.008    0.017   
  (0.017)   (0.016)  
RPCAB -0.000    0.002*  0.002** 
  (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
VETO  -0.027   -0.014  
  (0.032)   (0.033)  
FED  -0.064*** -0.078*** 0.220***  0.168*** 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.060) (0.046) 
STRIKE(-1) 0.000    0.000   
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
OPEN(-1) 0.002    -0.005***  -0.004*** 
  (0.001)   (0.002) (0.001) 
SOE 0.010  0.019**  0.004  0.010 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant  0.110 0.030 -0.035  -0.026 
  (0.230) (0.169) (0.198) (0.178) 
Observations  88 104  88 93 
Number  of  countries  13 13 13 13 
Wald chi
2  37.14 41.67 33.87 25.12 
Prob>chi
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AIC  122.79 154.71 153.26 157.70 
BIC  147.57 167.93 178.04 172.90 
Note: Dependent variable is yearly privatization proceeds in percent of BIP.
 *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard deviations are reported below each value in brackets.  
  
   33
Table 6: Prais-Winsten regression, corrected for contemporaneous correlation, serial correlation, 
and heteroskedasticity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP(-1) 0.027  0.023     
 (0.048)  (0.047)     
UNER(-1)  0.017 0.023 0.021 0.018 
 (0.041)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.046) 
GGFB(-1)  0.022 0.009 0.010 0.003 
 (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.046) 
ECOFREE -0.160       
 (0.301)       
RPCAB  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
VETO -0.084       
 (0.073)       
FED  -0.095** -0.081*  -0.092** -0.107*** 
 (0.039)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.038) 
STRIKE(-1) -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001* 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
OPEN(-1)  -0.003 -0.004 -0.003  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)   
SOE  0.055*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 
 (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
p9597  0.265 0.184 0.233 0.243 
 (0.251)  (0.219)  (0.191)  (0.190) 
p9800  0.332 0.369 0.432 0.455* 
 (0.310)  (0.318)  (0.263)  (0.256) 
Constant 1.719  -0.010  -0.025  -0.339 
 (2.421)  (0.375)  (0.369)  (0.440) 
Observations  97 97 97 97 
Number  of  countries  14 14 14 14 
Wald chi
2  54.39 61.43 62.18 30.03 
Prob>chi
2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Dependent variable is yearly privatization proceeds in percent of BIP.
 *, **, *** indicate significance at 
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